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What is the Primary Factor Responsible for Producing Changes in Policy Established by 
the Supreme Court? 
A Statistical Analysis of the Rehnquist Court 
 
Scholars have traditionally cited changes in Supreme Court membership as direct 
predictors of changes in collective voting patterns, but newer research indicates that other 
factors which had been virtually dismissed in terms of their motivational effects on 
justices may be more significant than previously thought. These other variables include a 
phenomenon known as ideological drift, which refers to the gradual but substantial shifts 
an individual Supreme Court justice experiences as a result of a series of psychosocial 
factors. In addition, vote-changing can occur in response to political pressure and public 
opinion. This paper seeks to determine the primary factor influencing shifts in Supreme 
Court precedent. A random sample of 34 First Amendment cases from the Rehnquist 
Court (1986-2005) was examined utilizing linear regression analysis. The results show 
that changes in Court membership, shifts in the ideology of the Court as a whole, the 
length of a justice’s Supreme Court tenure, the party of the president at the time a case is 
decided, the number of Republican-appointed justices on the Court at the time a case is 
decided, and the political composition of the Senate at the time a case is decided are all 
statistically significant predictors of variations in precedent. These findings indicate that 
membership, ideological, and public opinion factors are operating in conjunction to 
produce changes in precedent handed down by the Court. Implications for future research 
include the integration of existing decision-making models in order to provide the most 
complete picture of justices’ voting behavior and the resultant changes in policy 
established by the Supreme Court. 
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PART I: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Scholars have traditionally cited changes in Supreme Court membership as direct 
predictors of changes in collective voting patterns, but newer research indicates that 
another factor which had been virtually dismissed in terms of its motivational effects on 
justices may be more significant than previously thought. This other cause of changes in 
Supreme Court voting trends refers to an individual justice who changes his vote on a 
particular issue when that issue re-appears before the Court. Vote-changing occurs for a 
variety of reasons – most notably as a consequence of a phenomenon known as 
ideological drift, which refers to the concept that individual justices tend to experience 
changes in ideology during their tenures on the bench. Vote-changing can also be a 
response to political pressure and public opinion. 
Since the 1950s, when the Warren Court handed down some of the most liberal 
rulings our country has ever seen, conservative presidents have been engaged in an 
ongoing attempt to appoint staunch conservative justices to the Supreme Court in order to 
reverse prior liberal rulings. Nonetheless, this effort has proved futile until very recently, 
because although conservative presidents were appointing conservative justices to the 
High Court, these judges were, by and large, drifting to the left and crafting increasingly 
liberal opinions. 
In 2005, however, President Bush’s appointments of Chief Justice John Roberts 
and Justice Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court proved to realign the political ideology of 
the bench. During the October 2006 Term, the Roberts Court’s first full term, the Court 
handed down more split decisions than at any point in our nation’s recent judicial history. 
Justices divided sharply along ideological lines, with the four Court conservatives and the 
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four Court liberals consistently battling over now-swing Justice Anthony Kennedy’s fifth 
vote. But Kennedy has also voted conservatively in more cases than ever before during 
his tenure on the Court, indicating that perhaps the effects of new justices and ideological 
drift are working simultaneously to produce an increasingly conservative judiciary. This 
study therefore seeks to examine the question of whether new members on the Court, or 
individual justices’ changing views over time, is the primary factor in producing changes 
in Supreme Court policy. 
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PART II: 
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
 
While the judiciary was envisioned by our Founding Fathers as “beyond 
comparison the weakest of the three departments of power,” the Supreme Court has 
adopted an increasingly prevalent role in the formulation of policy in our society.1 
Casting the debate over the moral implications of judicial activism aside, it is 
undoubtedly clear that, over the past hundred years, the Court has handed down a series 
of rulings that have had profound impacts on shaping both the lives of Americans and the 
country’s history. This broad array of decisions ranges from the desegregation of schools 
in Brown v. Board of Education to abortion rights in Roe v. Wade to capital punishment 
in Furman v. Georgia. In light of the influence the Supreme Court has on the lives of 
ordinary citizens, it is important to understand how this branch of the government 
functions. 
Under Article III of the Constitution, the Court’s jurisdiction is extremely limited 
and is essentially confined to cases that revolve around constitutional issues and have 
been brought before the lower courts. This means that while an individual can never 
appeal on an issue of fact that has been decided by a jury – for example, one cannot 
merely appeal an unfavorable verdict by making the claim that the jury came to the 
wrong conclusion about the evidence – one can appeal on the basis of an issue of law – 
generally, where the judge erred and allowed, for instance, prejudicial evidence to be 
admitted, which caused the jury to view the evidence inaccurately. Thus, in order to 
appeal a case to the Supreme Court, a person must have exhausted all lower-court 
remedies, by having already appealed either to the highest state court (if the case is a 
                                                 
1 Federalist Paper No. 78, 1788, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, 2006.http://www.yale.edu/ 
lawweb/avalon/federal/fed78.htm 
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matter of state law), or to a United States Circuit Court of Appeals (if the case involves a 
violation of federal law). Generally, when appealing a state case, the case first gets 
appealed to a state court of appeals, and then to a state supreme court – although in death 
penalty cases many states have enacted automatic-appellate-review statutes which allow 
defendants to appeal directly to state supreme courts. When appealing a federal case, the 
case is appealed first to the federal district court for the state in which the issue arises, 
and then to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the given jurisdiction. There 
are 14 circuit courts of appeals for the 50 states, which means that each Court of Appeals 
covers multiple states known collectively as a circuit. Each United States Supreme Court 
Justice is assigned to one or more particular circuits, and a Circuit’s assigned justice will 
rule on matters, such as motions for extensions of time to file petitions with the Supreme 
Court, that come from individuals appealing cases from that given Circuit. 
The Court also possesses original jurisdiction, which means it may review 
conflicts between two states because of the obvious bias that would infect a case 
reviewed in one of the state courts involved in the issue. For example, when New York 
and New Jersey both laid claim to Ellis Island, the case was heard by the Supreme Court 
because it would have been virtually impossible for a court in either New York or New 
Jersey to decide the case impartially.2
In any situation where a case comes before the Supreme Court, the party that 
wishes to bring the case to the Court must petition the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari which, if issued, grants the party permission to bring its case before the Court. 
Once the petitioner (the party bringing suit) has filed for a writ, the respondent (the party 
that seeks to counter the petitioner’s claims) has the opportunity, but is not required, to 
                                                 
2 New Jersey v. New York. No 120 ORIG. Supreme Court of the United States. 26 May 1998 (1). 
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file a brief in opposition. The petitioner is then allowed to file a reply brief. These 
documents are submitted to the justices who discuss the case at an initial conference. 
Often, the justices will not reach any decision about a given case during the first 
conference, and the case will be discussed again at one or more subsequent conferences. 
However, the conferences are completely private and the justices issue no statements 
regarding any case that they consider, thereby enshrouding the process of granting cases 
in secrecy. 
If at least four out of the nine justices vote to grant certiorari, the case enters the 
“merits phase.” It should be noted that the justices currently grant about one percent of 
the cases submitted for review. During the merits phase the petitioner must file a brief on 
the merits of the case. The respondent is then obligated to file a brief on the merits, to 
which the petitioner has the option of filing one last reply brief before the briefs are 
submitted to the justices and the case is scheduled for oral argument.3 One or more 
outside parties are free to file additional briefs on the merits of the case in support of 
either the petitioner or the respondent. Such a party is known as an amicus curiae, or 
“friend of the Court.”4
If, on the other hand, four justices do not vote to grant certiorari, the petitioner 
has 30 days to submit a petition for rehearing. If this petition is denied as well, the case is 
for all intents and purposes dead, and the ruling of the lower court stands. A petitioner 
cannot re-submit a petition for certiorari after the initial petition has been denied. 
                                                 
3 The Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 25. Supreme Court of the United States (2007): 
34. 
4 The Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 37. Supreme Court of the United States (2007): 
51. 
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Once oral arguments have been heard from both the petitioner and the respondent 
in the case, the nine justices hold conferences to vote on the case. Unlike a criminal trial 
in which a unanimous verdict must be reached, the Supreme Court needs only a simple 
majority of the justices to vote one way in order to resolve an issue. The Court’s vote has 
two distinct effects that include the impact on the petitioner specific to the case, as well 
as the broader constitutional rule established by the Court, which is often called the 
precedent or the holding of a case. As a result of the fact that Supreme Court justices are 
nominated by presidents and serve for life, there are often shifts in the ideological 
composition of the Court depending on who is president and how many appointments to 
the Court he has the opportunity to make. Thus, the Court’s voting patterns as a whole – a 
concept referred to as collective voting – may differ on the basis of the Court’s 
membership.5 Because a change in the Supreme Court’s collective voting record on a 
given constitutional problem generally produces a new holding on the issue, differences 
in the Court’s aggregate votes are highly significant in terms of effecting new policy. 
Since the 1950s, the United States has witnessed a sort of ongoing battle over 
political control of the judiciary. The appointment of the either famously- or infamously-
liberal, depending on one’s political views, Earl Warren to the position of Chief Justice 
served to usher in a new era in the overturning of old precedent. After Warren’s 
retirement, and Nixon’s four “law and order” appointments, the nation waited in what 
was anxious anticipation for some, and fearful expectancy for others, for the Burger 
Court to reverse Warren’s landmark rulings expanding free speech rights and governing 
more stringently the actions of law enforcement officials. But the Burger Court proved to 
                                                 
5 Lawrence Baum, “Membership Change and Collective Voting Change in the United States Supreme 
Court.” The Journal of Politics 54 (1992): 4. 
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embody the conservative counter-revolution that never was. Although it did chip away at 
some of the Warren Court’s rulings, the Burger Court’s establishment of a constitutional 
right to privacy and its imposition of restrictions on the implementation of the death 
penalty served largely to further alienate conservatives. Moreover, in spite of the fact that 
the Burger Court’s successor, the Rehnquist Court, continued to erode many of the 
provisions of the liberal decisions handed down by Warren, it succeeded more in its 
attempts to keep religion out of the public sphere and to expand rights for women and 
gays than in its efforts to completely overturn prior liberal jurisprudence. 
President Bush has made two appointments to the current Supreme Court – Chief 
Justice John Roberts, a conservative who has replaced the also-conservative late Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist, and Justice Samuel Alito, an ultra-conservative who has 
replaced the moderate and often-swing vote Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. Bush’s 
appointments have, thereby, resulted in a transformation in the Court’s overall ideology 
from moderately conservative to conservative. In fact, many scholars actually refer to the 
Rehnquist Court as the O’Connor Court because of her position as the most influential 
voter – the member of the Court who served as the tiebreaker in such landmark cases as 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which upheld a woman’s right to obtain an abortion: 
“O’Connor [was]… the justice to watch…. Rehnquist may have occupied the center seat 
on the bench, but O’Connor was the justice in the middle.”6  
On the abortion issue alone, the Roberts Court has already handed down a five-to-
four decision in Gonzales v. Carhart, upholding the constitutionality of the Partial Birth 
Abortion Ban Act passed by Congress in 2003. The Act stipulates that women cannot 
                                                 
6Jan Crawford Greenburg, Supreme Conflict: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Control of the United 
States Supreme Court ( New York: Penguin Press, 2007), 20. 
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obtain late term abortions (referred to as “partial birth abortions” by social 
conservatives), and provides no exception for cases in which other, less safe medical 
procedures may put a woman’s health in jeopardy.7 When a state law with the exact same 
provisions was ruled on in 2000, however, during which both Rehnquist and, most 
importantly, swing-vote O’Connor were still on the bench, the decision came down five-
to-four against the law, stating that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence has always 
provided an exception for the health of the mother.8 In the more recent case, Roberts 
voted in the same way that his predecessor Rehnquist voted, but Justice Alito’s vote 
tipped the Court as he voted opposite his own predecessor, Justice O’Connor. 
These abortion cases are just one example of an issue in which changes in 
precedent have been exacted by the still-young Roberts Court. Overall, the October 2006 
Term showed evidence of an exceedingly fractured Court, which issued a total of 
twenty-three split decisions. Eighteen of these split decisions broke down along 
ideological lines, with Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence 
Thomas, and Samuel Alito serving as the conservative bloc and with Justices John Paul 
Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer functioning as the 
liberal bloc. Interestingly, Justice Anthony Kennedy was in the majority in all of these 
five-four decisions, indicating that he has become the new swing-vote on the Supreme 
Court. Nonetheless, it is clear that Kennedy swings right most of the time, as is 
                                                 
7 Gonzales v. Carhart. No. 05-380. Supreme Court of the United States. 18 April 2007 (1). 
8 Stenberg v. Carhart. No. 99-830, Supreme Court of the United States. 28 June 2000 (1). 
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evidenced by his twelve conservative, but only six liberal, votes in the eighteen cases 
that have split along typical ideological lines.9
Given the growing importance of the Supreme Court in American society, the 
tension present between the two fields of research on justices’ voting behavior, and 
Bush’s two new appointments to the Supreme Court, it is highly relevant to today’s 
political situation, and to the future of American politics in general, to determine whether 
changes in Court membership or changes in the voting behavior of individual justices is 
the primary factor responsible for producing variation in the Court’s collective voting 
patterns. While previous research attempts to isolate only one or two variables to prove 
that they have an impact on changes in Supreme Court precedent, this study endeavors to 
aggregate a wide array of factors to ascertain the most relevant. 
 The remainder of this paper seeks to provide an in-depth analysis of the issue at 
hand. Part III examines the theories and scholarly literature related to the Supreme 
Court’s decision-making process and variations in precedent and presents a hypothesis 
on the basis of this past research. Part IV discusses the study design and the statistical 
measures employed to test the hypothesis. Part V presents a statistical analysis of the 
data, and Part VI offers conclusions as well as the implications of this study for both 
future research and the American judiciary. 
                                                 
9Supreme Court of the United States October Term 2006 Overview. Georgetown Law Center Supreme 
Court Institute. 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/sci/documents/GULCSupCtInstituteFinalReportOT2006_29June07.pdf 
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PART III: 
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Given the consensus among scholars that over time, the Supreme Court’s 
collective voting patterns on issues change, which results in differences in relevant policy 
established by the Court, it is important to examine which factors are most responsible 
for producing these changes. Theoretically, in analyzing the behavior of groups of such 
complex individuals as Supreme Court justices, there are thousands of possible factors 
that are responsible for causing changes in behavior. Nonetheless, when looking at the 
primary cause of change in policy crafted by the Supreme Court, two major competing 
schools of thought emerge. The more traditional scholarly research focuses on changes in 
Court membership as the main cause of changes in collective voting patterns, while a 
newer group of scholars has targeted changes in the justices’ ideology as the most 
pertinent reason that collective voting trends change over time. This ideological school of 
thought can be subdivided into two groups of scholars: a group that views the justices’ 
changes in philosophy as responses to varying public opinion, and another faction that 
believes the justices drift to one side of the political spectrum during their time on the 
bench which accounts for changes in voting. 
Although there is also another school of thought that revolves around the change 
in the particular issues that come before the Court as a cause for change in Court policy, 
this is largely rejected as the primary factor that influences collective voting patterns by 
the scholarly community. Indeed, while virtually all interested parties recognize that 
changes in the issues do have some bearing on the way the Court votes on these issues, 
even advocates of this school of thought admit that it is unlikely that issue changes have 
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more of an effect on voting than the other factors mentioned. Because there is no breadth 
of compelling literature that cites issue changes as the chief cause of changes in collective 
voting patterns, and because issue changes are largely absorbed by changes in a justice’s 
position, this perspective will not be discussed throughout the remainder of this study. 
 
THE MEMBERSHIP PERSPECTIVE 
The membership school of thought cites changes in Court membership as the 
most influential factor in producing changes in collective voting patterns. Because 
Supreme Court justices sit for life, when a justice retires or dies, the president has the 
opportunity to appoint a new member of the Court. The nominee must be confirmed by 
the Senate, which has the opportunity to engage in a kind of “litmus testing” that entails 
questioning the candidate about his ideology, political leanings, and how he predicts he 
will vote on pertinent issues. Generally speaking, a president will appoint a candidate 
who shares his views, and whom the president therefore thinks will rule on the issues in a 
manner that advances the president and the justice’s shared set of beliefs. Proponents of 
the membership school of thought employ an attitudinal model in their research, which 
holds that personal beliefs are the most crucial motivating factor behind a justice’s 
decision and, moreover, that these individual values are stable over time. 10 Thus, 
according to the attitudinal model, because justices are appointed based on their ideas, 
and because these ideas change only very minimally, if at all, during their tenure on the 
bench, the major cause of change in the Court’s collective voting record is Court 
turnover. Supporters of the membership school of thought cite Justice Thurgood Marshall 
                                                 
10 William Mishler and Reginald S. Sheehan, “Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and Supreme Court 
Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective,” The Journal of Politics 58 (1996): 171. 
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and Chief Justice William Rehnquist as notable examples of justices who remained 
consistent in their positions during their time on the Court.11
In addition, scholars belonging to this school of thought have attempted to 
compare Courts that have existed in immediate succession to one another in order to 
isolate the effects of membership changes on collective voting. In examining the Vinson, 
Warren, and Burger Courts, Lawrence Baum has discovered that Court turnover is a more 
influential factor in determining changes in voting patterns than both changes in 
individual justices’ ideology and changes in issues that reappear before the Court.12 
Baum’s results indicate that the large fluctuations in the Court’s rulings on issues that 
occur coincide with changes in Court membership. Thus, when Chief Justice Fred Vinson 
was replaced by Earl Warren, for example, there was a 33 percent increase in support for 
civil liberties. Based on similar trends, Baum has showed that the evolution of the Court’s 
voting patterns on civil liberties occurred at the same time that there were high rates of 
membership change on the Court – namely, during the Warren and Burger Courts.13 
Similarly, Jeffrey Segal has argued that his construction of a model “which assumed that 
each Nixon/Ford appointment added… to the Burger Court’s conservatism worked best” 
in predicting the outcomes of actual cases.14
In another study in which Baum controlled for changes in issues coming before 
the Court, the data portray a 20 percent decline in the proportion of cases in which the 
Court supported civil liberties claims in the year immediately following Warren’s 
                                                 
11 Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, and Jeffrey A. Segal, “Ideological Drift among 
Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?,” Northwestern University Law Review (2007): 
7. 
12 Op Cit, Baum 1992, 3.  
13  Ibid, 13. 
14 Jeffrey A. Segal, “Measuring Change on the Supreme Court: Examining Alternative Models,” American 
Journal of Political Science 29 (1985): 461. 
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retirement. Further, over the rest of the Burger Court’s tenure, which spanned 15 years 
and witnessed a total of five new appointments to the bench, support for civil liberties 
claims dropped another 13.1 percentage points. 15 While these results support the notion 
that who is on the Court is the factor that produces shifts in precedent, this study, and 
similar research, has failed to take into account and control for the possibility that 
justices’ ideologies may have been changing over the 15 year period. 
 
THE IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The school of thought that posits that changes in Court collective voting are 
caused by often-substantial modifications in individual justices’ positions over time – a 
phenomenon known as ideological drift – is perhaps the most complex as it is closely 
intertwined with the psychological and sociological forces that affect the justices. 
Although the theory holds that any given justice is likely to drift, often changes in one 
justice’s position affect the other justices’ voting behaviors as a result of the group 
conformity effects discussed below. It is thus important to note that ideological drift 
refers to changes in the positions of one specific justice, but is often experienced by 
multiple justices at the same time, which leads to a more pronounced shift in the Court’s 
ideology as a group. Proponents of the ideological drift theory generally utilize an 
extralegal model, which holds that justices base their decisions on a set of personal 
beliefs that are subject to change. Unlike the attitudinal model, however, the extralegal 
model does not rely on the assumption of stability in voting.16
                                                 
15 Lawrence Baum, “Measuring Policy Change in the U.S. Supreme Court,” The American Political 
Science Review 82 (1988): 909. 
16 Tracey E. George and Lee Epstein, “On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making,” The American 
Political Science Review 86 (1992): 325. 
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According to Jon D. Hanson and Adam Benforado, there are complex 
psychological processes at work which account for the so-called ideological drift, such as 
the fundamental attribution error, which holds that humans generally attribute their 
behavior to dispositional factors such as personality and individual beliefs. Nonetheless, 
situational factors unique to a given set of circumstances – which trigger unconscious 
psychological processes – have proven to be more influential in motivating an 
individual’s actions.17 Thus, although nominees have specific and concrete views on 
certain issues, once they are actually seated on the bench, these principles are subject to 
change simply because serving on the High Court is so different from any of the other 
professions a justice may have held. As a justice, Hanson and Benforado argue, an 
individual is exposed to different sides of the issues that he would not have known about 
before he was on the bench, which leads to the evolution of his belief system. In addition, 
other processes such as conformity to a group’s ideas can lead to a sort of standardization 
of the Court’s views as a whole.18
Traditionally, ideological drift was known simply as the liberal or leftward drift 
because there was a large body of evidence that showed that justices appointed by 
conservative presidents would become progressively more liberal throughout their tenure 
on the Court. 19 Classic examples of justices that are cited by scholars for exemplifying 
the liberal drift are several of the justices who sat on the Warren Court – including the 
Chief Justice himself – as well as Harry Blackmun of the Burger Court. President Dwight 
Eisenhower’s appointees to the Warren Court, who were initially conservative, drifted 
quite far to the left and are in fact remembered today as some of the most liberal 
                                                 
17Jon D. Hanson and Adam Benforado, “The Drifters,” The Boston Review (2007): 1-6. 
18Ibid, 4. 
19 Ibid. 
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advocates for expanding individual freedoms to have ever served on the Court. Indeed, 
although Earl Warren presided over such landmark decisions as Brown v. Board of 
Education, which desegregated schools in the 1950s, and Miranda v. Arizona, which held 
that all suspects in criminal cases must be read their rights, earlier in his career Warren 
had presided over the relocation of Japanese populations into internment camps as 
governor of California. Furthermore, and perhaps the most notable example of a 
committed conservative turned loyal liberal, is Justice Harry Blackmun, who, after 
dissenting in the 1972 case Furman v. Georgia which declared capital punishment 
unconstitutional, authored a statement riddled with passion and regret in 1994, claiming 
that he would “‘no longer tinker with the machinery of death.’”20 While the leftward drift 
remains prevalent, new scholarly research on the topic indicates that several justices have 
also become increasingly conservative during their time on the bench. Thus, though it is 
still much more common for members of the Court to migrate to the left, it is now evident 
that drift towards the right occurs as well. Scholars have pointed out, for example, that 
Justices Stanley Forman Reed and Felix Frankfurter both grew more conservative while 
they served on the bench.21
 In any event, regardless of the direction to which justices drift, those who support 
the Court drift theory have used statistical methods in evaluating the ideological 
transformations that have occurred for various justices serving on the Court. Studies done 
by Lee Epstein, et al, have carefully analyzed the voting behavior of Supreme Court 
justices over time and concluded that “virtually every justice serving since the 1930s has 
                                                 
20 Op Cit. Epstein, et al 2007, 3. 
21 Lee Epstein, Valerie Hoekstra, Jeffry A. Segal, Harold J. Spaeth, “Do Political Preferences Change? A 
Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme Court Justices,” The Journal of Politics 60 (1998): 810. 
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moved to the left or the right or, in some cases, has switched directions several times.”22 
These researchers have found that although a justice’s ideology may remain stable over 
his first term on the bench, most justices “fluctuate soon thereafter.”23 Such results were 
obtained through the use of color-coded graphs for each justice which employ a so-called 
“baseline term” along the vertical axis that represents the justice’s initial position, as well 
as a comparison term that is located on the horizontal axis. By moving across the graph 
horizontally and noting the change (or lack thereof) in color, a justice’s ideological 
changes over time can be observed.24 Thus, the literature in this school of thought shows 
that Court drift over time, which is the product of a series of phenomena identified by 
social psychologists, produces changes in collective voting patterns. 
  
THE PUBLIC OPINION PERSPECTIVE 
Much like the scholars who hold that ideological drift is the major determinant of 
changes in Supreme Court policy, another group of scholars utilizes the extralegal model 
in holding that fluctuations in public opinion cause a justice to change his opinions over 
time. The public opinion perspective relies largely on the notion that because “the justices 
do not have the institutional capacities to give their rulings full effect,” as the Court lacks 
enforcement power, the justices must make their decisions conform to popular opinion.25 
Therefore, because the Court needs its rulings to be implemented by those in office in 
order for the Court as a whole to be considered legitimate, it is in the justices’ best 
interest to hand down decisions that are at least somewhat aligned with the public’s 
                                                 
22  Op Cit. Epstein, et al 2007, 3. 
23  Ibid, 1. 
24  Ibid, 19. 
25Kevin T. McGuire and James A. Stimson, “The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on 
Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences,” The Journal of Politics (2004): 1019. 
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views.26 According to Kevin T. McGuire and James A. Stimson’s study that analyzed the 
voting behavior of justices in relation to public opinion, in a large majority of the cases 
where the Supreme Court reversed a lower court’s ruling on a civil liberty issue, the 
Court’s decision was consistent with public opinion. Data on cases in which the Supreme 
Court affirmed a lower court’s decision on a civil liberty issue, however, yielded results 
that were statistically insignificant.27 Furthermore, McGuire and Stimson established that 
Supreme Court decisions closely followed public opinion even when there was no 
turnover on the Court.28
Additionally, a study by William Mishler and Ronald S. Sheehan sought to 
analyze the effects of public opinion on justices’ voting behavior. The researchers found 
that many justices do in fact change their votes between cases on similar issues in 
accordance with fluctuations in public opinion. Additionally, the study concluded that 
public opinion’s effect “is most pronounced for more moderate justices… [which] 
magnifies the impact of public opinion on the Court… since moderate justices occupy, by 
definition, critical positions as swing votes.”29 Indeed, scholars and advocates before the 
Supreme Court alike have consistently recognized Justice O’Connor, former swing-vote 
extraordinaire, as the Justice who most carefully shaped her opinions to resonate with 
public sentiment: “O’Connor tried to take everything into account, balancing every 
possible consideration against every other one…”30  
 
 
                                                 
26  Ibid. 
27  Ibid, 1030. 
28  Ibid. 
29 Op Cit. Mishler and Sheehan. 197. 
30 Mark Tushnet, A Court Divided: the Rehnquist Court and the Future of Constitutional Law. (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 54. 
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HYPOTHESIS 
 This research essentially focuses on the question of justice replacement versus 
shifts in individual justices’ opinions – either as a result of psychological factors or as a 
consequence of adapting to public opinion trends – as the more important factor effecting 
changes in collective Court voting. Therefore, given the overwhelming evidence that 
most justices can be influenced to engage in vote-changing as a result of their own 
evolving views, it is hypothesized that ideological drift is the primary factor responsible 
for producing variation in collective Court voting trends. 
 20 
 
 
PART IV: 
STUDY DESIGN 
 
It is hypothesized that variation in individual justices’ positions is the primary 
factor which produces changes in collective Court voting patterns. Examining changes in 
Court membership, ideological drift, and responses to public opinion as factors that effect 
changes in the Court’s collective voting record lends itself to a statistical design. Multiple 
regression analysis was therefore used to isolate the effects of these independent variables 
on the dependent variable, shifts in Supreme Court policy. The results were compared in 
order to determine which factor is most influential in producing changes in collective 
voting. 
 
SELECTION OF CASES 
 
In choosing cases with which to study the effects of changes in membership and 
changes in justices’ ideologies, First Amendment cases are an ideal population of cases 
from which to draw a sample. The First Amendment encompasses freedom of speech and 
freedom of religion, and First Amendment claims arise in a relatively large number of 
cases each term. The cases studied were taken from a twenty year time period to capture 
the effects of new justices on the bench as well as drifting justices. This period extended 
from 1986 through 2005, and thus includes the entire length of the Rehnquist Court, 
during which there was both turnover on the bench and justices who shifted their 
positions over time. This twenty year period provided excellent data for this study, 
because there was an abundance of jurisprudence on First Amendment issues which 
meant there was a large population of cases from which to draw. Further, the early and 
late Rehnquist Courts were composed of members with fairly opposite ideologies, so it is 
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reasonable to conclude that the results of the analysis of cases from these Courts will 
apply to Courts with similar ideologies to those examined here and to Courts that fall 
somewhere in between. Similarly, the Rehnquist Court was the immediate predecessor of 
the current Court, which therefore makes the results more generalizable to future cases 
and gives them more predictive validity than older cases.  
The study began by generating a comprehensive list of all the cases heard during 
the period from 1986 to 2005. Next, the cases that did not focus on First Amendment 
claims were subtracted from the list, which means the remaining cases were the full body 
of First Amendment cases heard by the Supreme Court during the time period being 
studied. This case inventory served as the population of cases in this study. After the list 
was compiled, a random sample of twenty percent of the cases was taken, which 
amounted to 34 cases, and which served as the sample for the study. The statistical 
breakdown was thus as follows: 
• Npopulation = all First Amendment cases heard from 1986 through 2005 = 
all cases heard from 1986 through 2005 – all cases not related to First Amendment 
• Nsample = 34 randomly selected First Amendment cases 
 
MEASURING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CHANGES IN PRECEDENT 
Because there are no measurement scales to examine changes in collective voting, 
this study employed an original scale. Changes in collective voting were looked at as the 
Court’s move from either a liberal or a conservative position on a First Amendment issue 
to the opposing ideological position. Additionally, it is important to note that when 
looking at whether a case resulted in a change in precedent, the established precedent on 
the issue that was examined was the holding in the case that immediately preceded the 
later case being examined. For example, if there were two similar rulings that came down 
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on the same issue fifty years apart, and the issue re-appeared again and over-turned the 
previous holding, the more recent precedent was examined. This was done to ensure that 
most cases that re-appeared did not weight the presence of new justices too heavily, as it 
was likely that re-appearing cases in which an old precedent was examined would have 
more new justices than re-appearing cases in which newer precedents were considered. 
As there were few cases that had been re-examined by the Court after long periods of 
time only, it was rare that cases on the same issue were heard by two completely different 
Courts, which eliminated the possibility that these cases would have been prevalent in the 
study. 
For the purposes of this study, a liberal stance on a First Amendment issue was 
defined as one that tends to bolster individual rights, whereas a conservative opinion was 
classified as one that restricts personal freedoms.31 Utilizing such a precise definition for 
the decisions in the cases helped to ensure reliability as there was little room for 
interpretation, which means that the results can be replicated easily. The dependent 
variable was coded as a dummy variable according to the following design. If the case 
had the same outcome in terms of the Court’s holding, the case was coded with a zero. 
An example of such an outcome is the case United States v. Eichman, in which the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of flag-burning as a form of protected speech – a principle 
first articulated in Texas v. Johnson.32
If there was some minor change in the ruling handed down by the Court, in terms 
of establishing new legal principles without dramatically altering the existing precedent 
on the issue, the case was termed a one. This is best evidenced by the 1973 case Miller v. 
                                                 
31 Op Cit, Baum 1992, 3. 
32 United States v. Eichman. No 89-1433. Supreme Court of the United States. 11 June 1990 (1). 
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California. In Miller, the Court upheld its ruling in Roth v. United States in 1957 that 
obscenity was not a form of protected speech under the First Amendment, but also 
created a stricter test for defining obscene materials.33 Cases that had a minor degree of 
liberal precedent change were coded with a positive one, whereas cases that evidenced a 
minor degree of conservative precedent change were coded with a negative one. 
If some major fundamental principles changed, the case was coded as a two. 
United States v. American Library Association serves as a prime example of a case that 
was assigned a two. In this case, the Court allowed Congress to withhold funding from 
libraries that refused to implement internet filters which restricted some speech that was 
protected under the First Amendment. While the Court had previously ruled that 
restrictions on internet content were unconstitutional, American Library Association 
ultimately only infringed on people’s ability to access these sites at public libraries and 
not within the privacy of their own homes. 34 If the Court established a major new liberal 
principle, the case was coded with a positive two, while a case that established a key new 
conservative principle was coded with a negative two. 
Finally, if the Court completely overturned existing precedent, which would entail 
both the establishment of new legal principles and a switch in the Court’s ruling on the 
issue from either liberal to conservative or from conservative to liberal, it was coded with 
a three. A crucial example of a drastic change in the Supreme Court’s reversal on a First 
Amendment issue is its 1996 decision in Agostini v. Felton, which overturned its decision 
in Aguilar v. Felton and held contrary to Aguilar that the Establishment Clause is not 
                                                 
33 Miller v. California. No.70-73. Supreme Court of the United States. 21 June 1973 (1). 
34 United States v. American Library Association. No. 02-361. Supreme Court of the United States. 23 
June 2003 (1). 
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violated when public school teachers teach in parochial schools.35 If a precedent was 
overturned to establish a new liberal holding, the case was coded with a positive three. 
Conversely, if the precedent was overturned to establish a new conservative holding, the 
case was coded with a negative three. 
 
MEASURING CHANGES IN COURT MEMBERSHIP 
 Changes in Court membership were measured by looking at the total number of 
new justices sitting on the Court in the second case of each case pair. Therefore, if there 
were three new justices on the bench when the Court re-examined an issue, the change in 
membership was entered as three. 
 
MEASURING CHANGES IN IDEOLOGY 
 Justices’ votes in each case were entered as liberal (one), mixed (zero), or 
conservative (negative one). Changes in ideology were measured by coding each justice’s 
vote as either a change in his vote from the previous case (one) or no change in his vote 
from the previous case (zero). If the justices had no vote in the prior case, no value was 
added. Similarly, because drifting justices often influence one another, the number of 
justices changing their opinions in each case was entered into the regression.  
 In addition, it was important to control for factors that are themselves likely to 
influence any given justice’s propensity to drift. This study had to account for the passage 
of time over each justice’s Supreme Court career because the ideological drift theory 
dictates that changes in justices’ opinions occur gradually over time. To that end, it was 
important to control for the length of a justice’s tenure. The number of years a justice had 
                                                 
35 Agostini v. Felton. No. 96-552. Supreme Court of the United States. 23 June 1997 (1). 
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been on the Court during each case was included in the regression model to account for a 
justice’s tenure on the bench. Likewise, it was also important to look at the justice’s age 
at the time of each case because the ideological drift theory holds that Supreme Court 
justices often drift more with age. Thus, for each case in a case pair, the justice’s age at 
the time of the case was inserted into the regression. 
 Research also indicates that a justice’s degree of judicial experience before 
serving on the Supreme Court may influence the stability of his positions. Thus, the 
number of years, if any, that the justice was a judge prior to his role on the Supreme 
Court was another variable that was included in the regression. Likewise, studies show 
that appellate experience may make a justice less likely to drift because he has already 
been exposed to some of the issues that come before the Supreme Court. The number of 
years, if any, a justice spent as an appellate judge before serving on the Supreme Court 
was therefore a factor in the regression as well. 
 Although there is no body of literature that indicates that a justice’s gender may 
affect his or her propensity to drift, it is plausible that gender may have some impact on 
judicial decision-making. Therefore, a dummy gender variable was included as well. A 
justice was coded with a zero for male and a one for female.  
 
MEASURING RESPONSES TO PUBLIC OPINION 
 The major indications of political climate are the party of the president, the ratio 
of Republicans to Democrats in the Congress, the political composition of the Supreme 
Court, and a justice’s confirmation vote. The party of the president at the time of the 
second case was coded as either Republican (zero), or Democrat (one). Similarly, 
although the president who appointed the justice may not have been in office at the time 
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the justice voted on all of the cases, research shows that justices may feel pressured to 
remain loyal to the presidents who appointed them. The appointing president’s party was 
therefore included in the regression as well, as either Republican (zero), or Democrat 
(one). 
 Because the composition of the House of Representatives changes every two 
years as a result of Congressional elections, the make-up of the House of Representatives 
in particular effectively captures shifts in popular opinion. Senators, too, are 
democratically elected (though less often), so changes in the ideological composition of 
the Senate reflect changes in public opinion. To that end, the percentages of Republicans 
in both the House of Representatives and the Senate at the time of each case were 
included in the regression.  
 Additionally, while Supreme Court justices sit for life and their political leanings 
may therefore represent the ideology of the time in which they were appointed, rather 
than the popular opinion at the time of the case they are ruling on, the overall political 
climate of the Court may be a factor influencing justices’ decisions. Consequently, the 
number of justices appointed by Republicans at the time of each case was entered into the 
regression. 
 A justice’s confirmation vote is also noteworthy because it reflects the Senate’s 
views on the justice. If the justice’s views are out of line with public opinion, either he 
may not be confirmed, or the Senate’s vote may be highly fractured. There is no better 
example of a splintered Senate vote than the vote at Clarence Thomas’ confirmation 
hearings. After a politically-charged scandal, Thomas was barely confirmed by 52 
percent of the Senate. Today, Thomas remains the most contentious member on the 
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Supreme Court. This indicates that when a candidate for the Supreme Court does not 
conform his views to public opinion before his confirmation hearings, he is equally – if 
not less – likely to align himself with popular sentiment once he has assumed his seat on 
the high Court’s bench. 
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Variables 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION MEASUREMENT 
Precedent Change Degree of precedent change in the 
second case in a case pair 
Binary: -3 (complete overturn 
to conservative holding), 
-2 (substantial new 
conservative legal principles 
espoused), -1 (slight 
conservative shift in 
precedent), 0 (no change), 1 
(slight liberal shift in 
precedent), 2 (substantial new 
liberal legal principles 
espoused), 3 (complete 
overturn to liberal holding) 
Membership 
Differences 
Number of new justices on the Court at 
the time the second case in a case pair 
was heard 
Numerical 
Judicial Experience Number of years a justice has served on 
any non-appellate court prior to 
Supreme Court appointment 
Numerical 
Appellate Experience Number of years a justice has served on 
any appellate court prior to Supreme 
Court appointment 
Numerical 
Total Court Change in 
Ideology 
Total number of justices changing their 
opinions in the second case in a case 
pair 
Numerical 
Individual Justice 
Change in Ideology 
Individual-level analysis of whether a 
justice changed his opinion in the 
second case in a case pair 
Binary: 0 (no) or 1 (yes) 
Supreme Court Tenure Number of years a justice has served on 
the Supreme Court at the time the 
second case in a case pair was heard 
Numerical 
Current President Political party of the president at the 
time the second case in the case pair 
was heard 
Binary: 0 (Republican) or 1 
(Democrat) 
Appointing President Political party of the president that 
appointed a justice  
Binary: 0 (Republican) or 1 
(Democrat) 
Confirmation Vote Percentage of the Senate that voted in 
favor of confirming a justice 
Numerical 
Number of 
Republicans on the 
Court 
Number of Republican justices on the 
Court at the time the second case in a 
case pair was heard 
Numerical 
Percentage of 
Republicans in House 
of Representatives 
Percentage of Republicans in the House 
of Representatives at the time the 
second case in a case pair was heard 
Numerical 
Percentage of 
Republicans in Senate 
Percentage of Republicans in the Senate 
at the time the second case in a case 
pair was heard 
Numerical 
Gender Individual justice’s gender Binary: 0 (male) or 1 (female) 
Figure 1: Description of variables and their units of measurement 
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PART V: 
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE DATA: THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
 The data being analyzed in this study consists of the random sample of 34 First 
Amendment cases. Interestingly, in four out of the five cases in which the Court voted to 
overturn precedent (coded as negative threes or threes), it handed down conservative 
rulings. Nonetheless, the majority (47 percent) of the cases were coded as ones, 
indicating that the Court chose to slightly expand First Amendment rights in the bulk of 
the cases examined in this study. This distribution is hardly surprising, as the Court more 
often than not prefers to chip away at previous rulings rather than to outright overturn 
precedent. 
  
 Precedent Change 
  Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 -3.00 4 11.8 11.8 11.8 
  -2.00 4 11.8 11.8 23.5 
  -1.00 3 8.8 8.8 32.4 
  .00 3 8.8 8.8 41.2 
  1.00 16 47.1 47.1 88.2 
  2.00 3 8.8 8.8 97.1 
  3.00 1 2.9 2.9 100.0 
  Total 34 100.0 100.0  
Figure 2: Frequency Table Showing the Degree of Precedent Change 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE DATA: THE MEMBERSHIP VARIABLES 
 
 As discussed previously, the membership perspective cites changes in justices on 
the Court as the primary factor influencing shifts in policy established by the Supreme 
Court. In terms of changes in membership, about 20 percent of the cases showed no 
change in membership. There were very few cases in which there were more than five 
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new justices on the bench. Indeed, over 75 percent of the cases had between zero and five 
new justices on the Court. 
       New Justices on the Court Between Cases 
 New 
Justices Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 0 7 20.6 20.6 20.6 
  1 2 5.9 5.9 26.5 
  2 5 14.7 14.7 41.2 
  3 4 11.8 11.8 52.9 
  4 3 8.8 8.8 61.8 
  5 5 14.7 14.7 76.5 
  6 2 5.9 5.9 82.4 
  7 2 5.9 5.9 88.2 
  8 2 5.9 5.9 94.1 
  9 2 5.9 5.9 100.0 
  Total 34 100.0 100.0  
Figure 3: Frequency Table Showing the Distribution of New Justices on the Court Between Cases 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE DATA: THE IDEOLOGY VARIABLES 
 
 There were a total of 302 votes cast in the 34 cases. Liberal votes constituted 51% 
of these votes, indicating that in spite of the fact that most justices were appointed by 
conservative presidents, they were willing to hand down rulings that expanded freedoms 
of speech and religion. On the other hand, about 37 percent of the votes cast were 
conservative, which shows that the conservative justices were not willing to abandon 
their roots entirely. The remainder of the votes were mixed and yielded some protection 
for, and some erosion of, First Amendment rights.  
 Vote in Case 
  Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 -1 113 37.4 37.4 37.4 
  0 35 11.6 11.6 49.0 
  1 154 51.0 51.0 100.0 
  Total 302 100.0 100.0  
Figure 4: Frequency Table Showing the Distribution of Votes in All Cases 
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 Of the 302 votes 45 percent of them reflected no change in the justice’s position 
between cases. Nonetheless, approximately 18 percent of the votes reflected some change 
in position, indicating that justices’ opinions are by no means completely stable over 
time. The missing observations represent those cases in which justices had no prior vote. 
 Individual Ideological Change 
 Case Votes Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 0 136 45.0 72.0 72.0 
  1 53 17.5 28.0 100.0 
  Total 
189 62.6 100.0  
Missing System 113 37.4   
Total 302 100.0   
Figure 5: Frequency Table Showing the Distribution of Changes in Individual Justices’ Ideologies 
 
 In the 34 cases examined, cases in which no justices changed their positions 
constituted about 35 percent of the sample. In general, vote changes occurred most often 
for one or two members during the same case, comprising roughly 44% percent of the 
total changes for multiple justices.  
 Change in Ideology – Court 
 Ideology 
Change Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 0 12 35.3 35.3 35.3 
  1 10 29.4 29.4 64.7 
  2 5 14.7 14.7 79.4 
  3 4 11.8 11.8 91.2 
  4 3 8.8 8.8 100.0 
  Total 34 100.0 100.0  
Figure 6: Frequency Table Showing the Distribution of Changes in Multiple Justices’ Ideologies  
The distribution of justices’ tenures on the Supreme Court at the time of each case 
was widely spread from zero to 33 years. The majority of cases, however, were voted on 
by justices who had served between five and 20 years on the Court. According to the 
ideological drift theory, this range serves as more than enough time for the justices to 
have begun to drift. 
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 Justices’ Tenures 
 Supreme 
Court 
Tenure Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 0 6 2.0 2.0 2.0 
  1 14 4.6 4.6 6.6 
  2 11 3.6 3.6 10.3 
  3 8 2.6 2.6 12.9 
  4 6 2.0 2.0 14.9 
  5 12 4.0 4.0 18.9 
  6 13 4.3 4.3 23.2 
  7 13 4.3 4.3 27.5 
  8 13 4.3 4.3 31.8 
  9 10 3.3 3.3 35.1 
  10 12 4.0 4.0 39.1 
  11 15 5.0 5.0 44.0 
  12 12 4.0 4.0 48.0 
  13 10 3.3 3.3 51.3 
  14 17 5.6 5.6 57.0 
  15 10 3.3 3.3 60.3 
  16 9 3.0 3.0 63.2 
  17 9 3.0 3.0 66.2 
  18 10 3.3 3.3 69.5 
  19 11 3.6 3.6 73.2 
  20 10 3.3 3.3 76.5 
  21 7 2.3 2.3 78.8 
  22 7 2.3 2.3 81.1 
  23 6 2.0 2.0 83.1 
  24 10 3.3 3.3 86.4 
  25 3 1.0 1.0 87.4 
  26 7 2.3 2.3 89.7 
  27 1 .3 .3 90.1 
  28 10 3.3 3.3 93.4 
  29 5 1.7 1.7 95.0 
  30 4 1.3 1.3 96.4 
  31 6 2.0 2.0 98.3 
  32 4 1.3 1.3 99.7 
  33 1 .3 .3 100.0 
  Total 302 100.0 100.0  
Figure 7: Frequency Table Showing the Distribution of Justices’ Supreme Court Tenures During Each 
Case 
 
 The distribution of justices’ ages was also wide, ranging from 44 to 85. The 
majority of votes (56.9 percent) were cast by justices between the ages of 56 and 71. 
While justices who were 56 may have been at the beginning of their Supreme Court 
careers, justices in the upper bounds of that range may have been on the bench for a 
substantial period of time, increasing the likelihood that they had begun to drift.  
         Justices’ Ages 
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 Age Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 44 3 1.0 1.0 1.0 
  46 3 1.0 1.0 2.0 
  47 2 .7 .7 2.6 
  48 3 1.0 1.0 3.6 
  51 8 2.6 2.6 6.3 
  52 7 2.3 2.3 8.6 
  53 8 2.6 2.6 11.3 
  54 5 1.7 1.7 12.9 
  55 6 2.0 2.0 14.9 
  56 11 3.6 3.6 18.5 
  57 10 3.3 3.3 21.9 
  58 10 3.3 3.3 25.2 
  59 8 2.6 2.6 27.8 
  60 7 2.3 2.3 30.1 
  61 12 4.0 4.0 34.1 
  62 11 3.6 3.6 37.7 
  63 14 4.6 4.6 42.4 
  64 13 4.3 4.3 46.7 
  65 14 4.6 4.6 51.3 
  66 9 3.0 3.0 54.3 
  67 11 3.6 3.6 57.9 
  68 14 4.6 4.6 62.6 
  69 8 2.6 2.6 65.2 
  70 11 3.6 3.6 68.9 
  71 10 3.3 3.3 72.2 
  72 7 2.3 2.3 74.5 
  73 4 1.3 1.3 75.8 
  74 5 1.7 1.7 77.5 
  75 7 2.3 2.3 79.8 
  76 6 2.0 2.0 81.8 
  77 5 1.7 1.7 83.4 
  78 5 1.7 1.7 85.1 
  79 13 4.3 4.3 89.4 
  80 11 3.6 3.6 93.0 
  81 3 1.0 1.0 94.0 
  82 10 3.3 3.3 97.4 
  83 1 .3 .3 97.7 
  84 6 2.0 2.0 99.7 
  85 1 .3 .3 100.0 
  Total 302 100.0 100.0  
Figure 8: Frequency Table Showing the Distribution of Justices’ Ages During Each Case 
 
Judicial experience prior to serving on the Supreme Court ranged from zero to 14 
years for the 13 justices studied. The distribution of years of judicial experience was 
fairly even. 
 Prior Judicial Experience 
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  Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 0 2 15.4 15.4 15.4 
  1 1 7.7 7.7 23.1 
  4 1 7.7 7.7 30.8 
  5 2 15.4 15.4 46.2 
  6 1 7.7 7.7 53.8 
  7 1 7.7 7.7 61.5 
  11 1 7.7 7.7 69.2 
  12 1 7.7 7.7 76.9 
  13 2 15.4 15.4 92.3 
  14 1 7.7 7.7 100.0 
  Total 13 100.0 100.0  
Figure 9: Frequency Table Showing the Distribution of Prior Judicial Experience 
  
 Like judicial experience, appellate experience ranged from zero to 14 years. 
Almost 31 percent of the justices who voted in the cases in the sample had no appellate 
experience before serving on the Supreme Court. Appellate experience in particular is 
viewed as a crucial factor for exposing justices to policy issues that arise before the 
Supreme Court, and a lack of experience may have contributed to drifting among these 
justices. 
 Prior Appellate Experience 
 Appellate 
Experience Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 0 4 30.8 30.8 30.8 
  1 1 7.7 7.7 38.5 
  4 1 7.7 7.7 46.2 
  5 2 15.4 15.4 61.5 
  6 1 7.7 7.7 69.2 
  11 1 7.7 7.7 76.9 
  13 2 15.4 15.4 92.3 
  14 1 7.7 7.7 100.0 
  Total 13 100.0 100.0  
Figure 10: Frequency Table Showing Distribution of Years of Prior Appellate Experience 
  
 In terms of gender, since there have only ever been two women who have served 
on the Supreme Court, the overwhelming majority of votes cast were by male justices. 
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Men’s votes constituted almost 81 percent of the total votes, whereas women’s votes 
made up a mere 18 percent of the vote total. 
 
    Gender 
  Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 0 247 81.8 81.8 81.8 
  1 55 18.2 18.2 100.0 
  Total 302 100.0 100.0  
Figure 11: Frequency Table Showing Distribution of Justices’ Votes By Gender  
 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE DATA: THE PUBLIC OPINION VARIABLES 
  
 The distribution of the presidents’ parties during each of the cases indicates that 
the presidency was held by Republicans for most of the time period studied. Republican 
presidents were in power during almost two-thirds of the cases, which means that public 
opinion likely trended towards conservatism over these 20 years. 
  
 Presidents’ Parties During Each Case 
 Current 
Presidents’ 
Parties Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 0 22 64.7 64.7 64.7 
  1 12 35.3 35.3 100.0 
  Total 34 100.0 100.0  
Figure 12: Frequency Table Showing Distribution of Presidents’ Parties During Each Case  
 Furthermore, the justices voting in the sample of cases were almost all appointed 
by Republican presidents. Nine, or roughly 70 percent, of the 13 justices studied here 
were nominated by conservative presidents. According to the public opinion perspective, 
this means that at least some of these justices should have voted conservatively in a 
majority of cases with previously liberal precedents, in order to remain loyal to their 
appointing president. 
 
 
 Appointing Presidents’ Parties 
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 Appointing 
Presidents’ 
Parties Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 0 9 69.2 69.2 69.2 
  1 4 30.8 30.8 100.0 
  Total 13 100.0 100.0  
Figure 13: Frequency Table Showing Distribution of Appointing Presidents’ Parties 
In examining the proportion of the House of Representatives that was Republican 
during each case, the distribution ranges from 38 to 54 percent. Fewer cases were decided 
when there was a minority of Republican Congressmen (13 cases, or 38.2 percent) than 
when Republicans controlled the House (21 cases, or 61.8 percent). The theory that 
public opinion is the most important factor contributing to changes in Supreme Court 
policy dictates that the majority of case outcomes should have chipped away at liberal 
precedents in favor of more conservative rulings. 
Republican Percentage of the House of Representatives During Each Case 
 
Republicans 
in House Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 38% 2 5.9 5.9 5.9 
  40% 5 14.7 14.7 20.6 
  41% 5 14.7 14.7 35.3 
  42% 1 2.9 2.9 38.2 
  51% 7 20.6 20.6 58.8 
  52% 3 8.8 8.8 67.6 
  53% 10 29.4 29.4 97.1 
  54% 1 2.9 2.9 100.0 
  Total 34 100.0 100.0  
Figure 14: Frequency Table Showing the Distribution of Republican Percentages of the House of 
Representatives During Each Case  
 
Similarly, the percentage of Republicans in the Senate during each case 
constituted a majority in 18, or 52.9 percent, of the cases. Again, scholars from the public 
opinion school of thought would predict conservative case outcomes during the years in 
which Republicans dominated the Senate.  
 
 
 Republican Percentage of the Senate 
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  Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 43% 2 5.9 5.9 5.9 
  44% 2 5.9 5.9 11.8 
  45% 8 23.5 23.5 35.3 
  50% 3 8.8 8.8 44.1 
  51% 3 8.8 8.8 52.9 
  52% 4 11.8 11.8 64.7 
  53% 2 5.9 5.9 70.6 
  55% 10 29.4 29.4 100.0 
  Total 34 100.0 100.0  
Figure 15: Frequency Table Showing the Distribution of Republican Percentages of the Senate 
 
 The makeup of the Court was overwhelmingly conservative between 1986 and 
2005. There were seven Republican appointees during 85 percent of the cases and there 
were never fewer than six Republican appointees during the entire 20 year period covered 
by the study. This should translate into a conservative political climate on the Court and, 
therefore, into increasingly conservative decisions. 
 
 Number of Republicans on the Court During Each Case 
 Court 
Republicans Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 6 2 5.9 5.9 5.9 
  7 29 85.3 85.3 91.2 
  8 3 8.8 8.8 100.0 
  Total 34 100.0 100.0  
Figure 16: Frequency Table Showing the Distribution of the Number of Republicans on the Court During 
Each Case 
 
 Justices’ confirmation votes served as the final measure of public opinion. 
Although not all confirmation votes were available because confirmation hearings used to 
employ voice votes which were not recorded, it is clear that a large proportion (45 
percent) of the justices in this study were confirmed unanimously. In fact, there were only 
two justices in the study who received less than 75 percent of the support of the Senate. 
These results indicate that most of the justices studied here were approved by a wide 
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margin and were therefore deemed by the Senate to hold viewpoints that coincided with 
popular opinion. 
 Justices’ Confirmation Votes 
 Confirmation 
Votes Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 52% 1 6.7 8.3 8.3 
  72% 1 6.7 8.3 16.7 
  86% 1 6.7 8.3 25.0 
  91% 2 13.3 16.7 41.7 
  97% 1 6.7 8.3 50.0 
  100% 5 45.0 50.0 100.0 
  Total 11 80.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 20.0   
Total 14 100.0   
Figure 17: Frequency Table Showing the Distribution of Justices’ Confirmation Votes 
 
 
 
MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 Before running the regressions, it was necessary to make sure that there were no 
problematic correlations between any of the independent variables. To that end, a Pearson 
Correlation Test was conducted. The results of the test indicate that the Republican 
percentages of the House of Representatives and the Senate were in fact correlated. Thus, 
it was necessary to drop one of these variables in order to avoid biasing the regression. 
The variable measuring the Republican percentage of the House of Representatives was 
dropped because, given the relative sizes of the House and the Senate, each individual 
Senator clearly exerts more influence on shaping public policy.
 Table of Correlations 
 Member 
Differences 
Judicial 
Experience 
Appellate 
Experience 
Total 
Court 
Change 
in 
Ideology 
Individual  
Justice 
Change in 
Ideology 
Supreme 
Court 
Tenure 
Current 
President 
Appointing 
President 
Confirmation 
Vote 
Number of 
Republicans 
on the 
Court 
Percentage 
of  
Republicans 
in House of 
Representatives 
Percentage 
of 
Republicans 
in Senate 
Judicial 
Experience 
.041            
Appellate 
Experience 
.020 .780           
Total Court 
Change in 
Ideology 
-.420 .046 .017          
Individual 
Justice Change 
in Ideology 
-.506 -.311 -.198 .267         
Supreme Court 
Tenure 
-.074 -.494 -0.370 -.052 .420        
Current 
President 
.201 .070 .023 -.083 -.107 -.142       
Appointing 
President 
-0.005 .314 .419 .033 -.133 -0.083 -.033      
Confirmation 
Vote 
-0.031 .466 .459 -.019 .080 -0.017 -.066 .119     
Number of 
Republicans on 
the Court 
.081 -.004 -.047 -.148 -.095 -0.010 .255 -.080 -.037    
Percentage 
of Republicans 
in House of 
Representatives 
.145 .166 .116 .098 -.074 .022 .310 .006 -0.134 -.172   
Percentage of 
Republicans 
 in Senate 
.180 .193 .104 .044 -0.061 .018 .329 .017 -0.113 -.223 .880*  
Gender .022 .130 .227 .018 -.033 -.148 .031 .185 .268 -.029 .108 .119 
Figure 18: Table of Correlations 
Note: * indicates that the variables exhibit some multicollinearity and may bias the regression. 
 In the first regression, the dependent variable change in precedent was regressed 
on only the independent variables that measure changes in membership and ideology. 
The independent variables that measure public opinion were not included in this 
regression. In order to be considered statistically significant for the purposes of this 
study, a variable must have a t-value of -2.0 or less, or 2.0 or greater. Thus, the results of 
this regression indicate that, for the random sample of First Amendment cases, the only 
variables that meet the requirement for statistical significance are membership differences 
and the total number of justices changing their positions. 
The results of the regression indicate a coefficient of -.10 for membership change. 
The statistical interpretation of this coefficient signifies that change in membership and 
change in precedent are negatively correlated. Therefore, the more new justices there are 
on the bench, the more likely it is that existing precedent becomes conservative. 
Additionally, the value of -.10 means that each one-unit increase in membership change 
decreases the dependent variable by .10 units. Because the dependent variable is change 
in precedent, which was coded by the numbers zero through three to reflect the different 
degrees to which the Supreme Court could shift precedent, every new justice on the 
bench will make precedent more conservative by a value of .10. For example, one new 
justice might decrease the dependent variable from 0 to -.10. 
 In addition, the variable that measured the total number of justices who changed 
their ideologies is also significant. The regression yielded a coefficient of -.24 for this 
variable, which means that each one-unit increase in ideology change decreases the 
dependent variable by .24 units. Therefore, each additional justice changing his opinion 
in any given case increases the conservativeness of the precedent by .24. 
 
 Moreover, it is important to examine the R2 value, which indicates the degree to 
which the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. 
R2 always falls between zero and one, where zero means that none of the variation in the 
dependent variable is explained by variation in the independent variables, and where one 
means that all of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by variation in the 
independent variables. The value of R2 in this regression is .04, which is relatively low 
and means that little of the variation in precedent can be attributed to changes in both 
Court membership and justices’ ideologies. This may be a consequence of the fact that 
the regression here excludes the effects of public opinion. 
 The next regression contains only the variables measuring public opinion and the 
dependent variable. In this regression, the variables that are statistically significant are the 
president’s party at the time of the case, the number of Republicans on the Court, and the 
percentage of the Senate that was Republican at the time of the case. 
 The coefficient for the president’s party during the case is -.54, which portrays an 
inverse relationship between the party of the president and the likelihood that precedent 
will shift in the liberal direction. In this study, the president’s party was assigned a value 
of zero, meaning Republican, or one, meaning Democrat. Therefore, the regression shows 
that when there is a one unit increase in the party of the president, meaning a change from 
a Republican to a Democrat, precedent becomes more conservative by .54 units. 
 In terms of the Republican composition of the Court, the coefficient is 1.20, 
meaning that each additional Republican justice on the Court actually makes Supreme 
Court policy more liberal by 1.20 units. This is an interesting finding, because it means 
that despite the fact that these justices are conservative, they are actually liberalizing 
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Court precedents. Essentially, it reaffirms the fact that despite Republican appointments, 
conservative justices never managed to quite reverse prior liberal rulings, and instead 
expanded First Amendment rights. 
 Additionally, there is a positive relationship between the percentage of 
Republicans in the Senate and the probability that Supreme Court policy will shift and 
become more liberal. The coefficient for this variable is .10, which is a rather odd finding 
as it means that that each additional percentage point of Republicans in the Senate 
increases the degree of liberalism in Supreme Court policy by .10 units. 
 In this regression, the value of R2 is .08, which means that there are many other 
variables that explain variations in Supreme Court policy. This is understandable, as the 
only variables included in this regression are those that measure changes in public 
opinion. 
 The next regression that was conducted regressed the dependent variable 
precedent change on all of the variables in the study. This was done to prove that 
variables that were statistically significant in simpler regressions remained significant 
when all of the variables were included, making them statistically robust. Indeed, in this 
regression, all of the previously significant variables maintained significance. The 
coefficient for change in members remained relatively stable, decreasing slightly from     
-.10 to -.12. Again, this coefficient shows that every new justice shifts Supreme Court 
policy to a more conservative outcome by -.12 units. 
 The coefficient for the total number of changing justices’ ideologies remained 
exactly the same at -.24. Thus, each additional justice changing his opinion in a case 
raises the degree of conservatism in Supreme Court precedent by .24 units. 
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 The party of the president in power during the case also remained significant. In 
this regression, the coefficient for this variable is -.57, a slight decline from the -.54 
generated by the previous regression. Here too, this signifies that when the party of the 
president changes from Republican (zero) to Democrat (one), precedent becomes more 
conservative by .57 units. 
 The coefficient for number of Republicans on the Court stayed the same at 1.20. 
As before, this means that each additional Republican justice on the Court actually makes 
Supreme Court policy more liberal by 1.20 units. 
 The percentage of Republicans in the Senate remained statistically significant and 
yielded a coefficient of .13, a slight decrease from the .10 coefficient obtained in the 
previous regression. This means that each additional percentage point of Republicans in 
the Senate makes precedent more liberal by .13 units. Because there are 100 Senators, 
which makes each Senator exactly one percent of the Senate, this coefficient means that 
each additional Republican Senator shifts Supreme Court policy to a more liberal 
outcome by .13 units. 
 Finally, the value of R2 in this regression is .14. This signifies that all of the 
independent variables, taken together, explain 14 percent of the variation in precedent. 
 The fourth regression that was run included only the small subset (62 total case 
votes) of the sample in which there were no changes in membership. This regression was 
run in order to examine the effects of ideological changes and public opinion on cases in 
which new members could not influence the case outcomes. 
 In this regression, the only statistically significant variable is percentage of 
Republicans in the Senate. The coefficient for this variable is .29, which means that each 
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additional percentage point of Republicans in the Senate raises the degree of liberalism in 
a Court precedent by .29 units.  
 The R2 value in this regression is .29. This is highly significant as it shows that 
when there are no membership changes, 29 percent of all variation in Supreme Court 
policy can be explained by changes in Court ideology and public opinion. 
 The final regression that was run sought to examine the factors that are most 
likely to influence an individual Supreme Court justice to change his opinion. To that 
end, individual justice change in ideology served as the dependent variable, and was 
regressed on all of the independent variables. 
 In this regression, membership changes proved to be correlated with an individual 
justice’s propensity to drift. The coefficient for membership changes is -.11, which 
indicates that each new justice on the Court makes an individual justice less likely to drift 
by .11 units.  
 Years of judicial experience and change in an individual justice’s ideology are 
also correlated. The coefficient for this variable, -.04, indicates that each additional year 
of judicial experience makes a justice .04 units less likely to shift positions. This is likely 
a result of the fact that justices who have served on the judiciary prior to their Supreme 
Court appointments have been exposed to many of the issues that arise before the Court, 
and they are therefore more stable in their positions. 
 Not surprisingly, total Court change in ideology is statistically significant as well. 
The coefficient here is .06, which means that each additional justice who changes his 
opinion increases the likelihood that another justice will also change his position by .06 
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units. This fits well with the ideological drift theory, which holds that drifting justices are 
likely to influence other justices to change their own positions. 
 The results indicate that Supreme Court tenure is correlated with an individual 
justice’s propensity to drift as well. The coefficient for this variable is .02, which means 
that each additional year a Supreme Court justice spends on the Court increases the 
likelihood that he will drift by .02 units. 
 Further, confirmation vote predicts an individual justice’s propensity to drift. 
Interestingly, this regression yields a coefficient of .92 for confirmation vote, which 
means that each additional Senator that votes to confirm a justice increases the likelihood 
that a justice will drift by .92 units. 
The value of R2 in this regression is .47. This means that the factors discussed above 
explain 47 percent of variation in an individual justice’s likelihood to change his opinion. 
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Regression Results 
 (1) 
Membership 
Change  and 
Ideology 
Change 
Regression, 
With 
Precedent 
Change as 
the 
Dependent 
Variable 
(2) 
Public 
Opinion 
Regression, 
With 
Precedent 
Change as the 
Dependent 
Variable 
(3) 
Regression 
Including All 
Variables, With 
Precedent 
Change as the 
Dependent 
Variable 
(4) 
Regression for 
Cases in 
Which There 
Were No New 
Members, 
With Precedent 
Change as the 
Dependent 
Variable  
(5) 
Regression 
Including All 
Variables, 
With 
Individual 
Justice 
Change in 
Ideology as 
the 
Dependent 
Variable 
Membership 
Differences 
-.10** 
(.04) 
 -.12** 
(.04) 
(Dropped) -.11** 
(.01) 
Judicial 
Experience 
.00 
(.03) 
 -.058* 
(.03) 
-.06  
(.08) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
Appellate 
Experience 
-.00  
(.03) 
 .00  
(.03) 
.00 
(.06) 
.01* 
(.01) 
Total Court 
Change in 
Ideology 
-.24** 
(.08) 
 -.24** 
(.08) 
-.33* 
(.20) 
.06** 
(.03) 
Supreme 
Court Tenure 
-.01 
(.01) 
 -.03** 
(.01) 
-.04* 
(.04) 
.02** 
(.00) 
Current 
President 
 -.54** 
(.22) 
-.57** 
(.22) 
-.09 
(.70) 
.09* 
(.08) 
Appointing 
President 
 .13  
(.23) 
.25 * 
(.25) 
.15 
(.59) 
-.15* 
(.09) 
Confirmation 
Vote 
 .25  
(.65) 
1.10*  
(.83) 
1.44 
(1.9) 
.92** 
(.28) 
Number of 
Republicans 
on the Court 
 1.20**  
(.27) 
1.20** 
(.27) 
1.44* 
(1.14) 
-.09* 
(.09) 
Percentage of 
Republicans 
in House 
  
(Dropped) 
 
(Dropped) 
 
(Dropped) 
 
(Dropped) 
Percentage of 
Republicans 
in Senate 
 .10** 
(.02) 
 .13** 
(.03) 
.29** 
(.07) 
.38 
(.89) 
Gender .11 
(.25) 
 -.13 
(.26) 
.22 
(.58) 
-.01 
(.08) 
Observations 302 293 293 62 293 
R2 .04 .08 .14 .29 .47 
Figure 19: Summary of All Regressions Run 
Note: * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively. 
Regression (1) contains independent variables measuring or predicting changes in membership and 
ideology only, and the dependent variable is change in precedent. Regression (2) contains independent 
variables measuring changes in public opinion only, and the dependent variable is change in precedent. It 
includes nine fewer observations because the confirmation vote variable, which is missing observations, is 
included in the regression. Regression (3) contains all independent variables, and the dependent variable is 
change in precedent. Regression (4) contains all independent variables, and the dependent variable is 
change in precedent, but includes only those cases in which there are no membership changes. The number 
of observations is thus significantly smaller than in the other regressions. Regression (5) contains all 
independent variables, and the dependent variable is individual justice’s change in ideology.  
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SECTION VI: 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This study both disproved the hypothesis and called into question traditional 
research. The hypothesis, which maintained that variation in justices’ ideologies is the 
primary factor responsible for influencing variation in precedent, was incorrect because 
the results showed that variations in membership, justices’ ideologies, and public opinion 
all had significant effects on case outcomes. In fact, while there was only one statistically 
significant variable for both membership changes and ideological changes, there were 
four public opinion factors that were statistically significant in terms of their effects on 
shifting policy established by the Supreme Court. The sum of the public opinion 
variables’ coefficients indicates that changes in public opinion actually exert more 
influence on changes in precedent than either membership or ideological variations. 
 Furthermore, the public opinion variables had some odd results. For example, the 
Supreme Court is more likely to shift policy to the right when there is a Democratic 
president in office. Nonetheless, this is likely the result of a Court backlash against a 
liberal presidency. 
 It is also important to analyze the results of the regression that was run for cases 
in which there were no changes in Court membership. This regression showed that only 
public opinion variables remain significant in the absence of new justices. Moreover, the 
R2 value in this regression signified that 29 percent of variation in precedent is due to 
public opinion variables when there is no justice turnover. While this number may be 
somewhat inflated because the subset of cases in which there were no new members of 
the Court was much smaller than the total sample, it is still exceptionally high and speaks 
to the pressures that public opinion exerts on justices as they formulate their decisions. 
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 In addition, it is clear that many of the variables discussed in the literature do in 
fact contribute to ideological drift. Surprisingly, new members on the Court actually 
decrease the likelihood that a given justice will drift. Nevertheless, when looking at the 
Rehnquist Court this finding makes sense as there was a twelve year period during which 
there was no Court turnover, but important ideological transformations among justices 
still occurred. Justice O’Connor serves as the classic example to illustrate this point, 
because she arrived at the Court a dedicated conservative who had been active in the 
Republican Party and, despite the lack of changes during a portion of Rehnquist’s tenure 
as chief justice, she evolved into the moderate swing-vote responsible for shifting 
precedent. 
 Judicial experience, which was also discussed by the literature, proved to be 
important in influencing a justice’s propensity to drift. As predicted by prior research, the 
more judicial experience a justice has, the less likely he is to change his opinions once he 
is on the Court. Further, total change in the Court’s ideology is positively correlated with 
an individual justice’s change in beliefs. This can mean that either multiple justices on 
the Court successfully convince an individual justice to shift his opinion, or that 
individual justices can sometimes effectively lobby other members of the Court to change 
their positions on an issue. In any event, it is clear that the effects of ideological drift are 
in fact augmented by simultaneous changes in ideology experienced by multiple justices. 
As the literature indicated, Supreme Court tenure also influences a justice’s propensity to 
drift. The results here show that an individual justice is more likely to drift with each 
additional year he spends on the Court – which is exactly what the ideological drift 
theory predicts. 
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 Additionally, in terms of public opinions influence on the probability that a justice 
will drift, it is interesting to note that the greater a justice’s confirmation vote, the more 
likely he is to change his attitudes once he is on the bench. This may be a consequence of 
the fact that presidents often try to appoint moderate justices to avoid the confirmation 
battles that necessarily ensue upon the nomination of controversial justices. While these 
moderate candidates are the most likely to be confirmed by the Senate, they are also the 
most likely to drift once they are on the bench. 
 This is not to discount the impact of differences in the Court’s membership. The 
effect of new justices on the Supreme Court was also found to be statistically significant 
in terms of effecting changes in policy and changes in individual justices’ beliefs. 
However, the fact that the variable measuring total changes in the Court’s ideology, and 
the public opinion variables representing the party of the president, the number of 
Republicans on the Court, and the Republican percentage of the Senate at the time of the 
case, were also significant highlights the flaws with traditional research that focuses 
solely on Court membership. Rather, the attitudinal and extralegal models may need to be 
merged in order to account for the complex series of factors that affect Supreme Court 
justices’ voting behaviors.  
In terms of problems with the study, there was in fact a minor methodological 
flaw. Although the sample constituted a full twenty percent of the population of First 
Amendment cases spanning a twenty-year period, perhaps a more copious sample might 
have yielded results that had a higher R2 value. This problem can be addressed by future 
studies perhaps with the selection of a larger random sample, which will detract from the 
influence of possible outliers and add to the study’s generalizability. Another way to 
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achieve this result would be to expand the universe of cases to include all civil liberties 
cases, which might better show the effects of new justices and changes in justices’ 
original opinions on existing precedent. 
An analysis of the generalizability of these results shows that the results are most 
generalizable to the entire population of First Amendment cases in the time period being 
studied. Further, it is relatively safe to conclude that the results are also generalizable to 
First Amendment cases heard by prior Courts, as the early and late and Rehnquist Court, 
examined in this study, were quite different from one another, and encompassed dramatic 
differences in voting behaviors. The early Rehnquist Court, for example, was somewhat 
left-leaning as, though it was headed by the conservative Chief Justice Rehnquist, it was 
composed of such extremely liberal members as Justices William Brennan, Thurgood 
Marshall, and the leftward-drifting Harry Blackmun. Conversely, the late Rehnquist 
Court was moderately conservative, albeit much more conservative relative to the early to 
middle Rehnquist Court. It was, in marked contrast, made up of such notoriously 
conservative members as Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Because the 
transition from the early to the late Rehnquist Court was so drastic, it can reasonably be 
assumed that the precedent shifts in First Amendment cases that were heard by prior 
Courts, which probably fell somewhere in between the two extreme examples offered 
here, would have been influenced by membership and ideological changes to relatively 
the same degree as the cases studied here. By the same token, First Amendment cases 
heard by future Courts will also likely fall in between the early and late Rehnquist Courts 
in terms of the fact that the opinions of their members will be affected similarly by 
ideological changes and by variations in membership. 
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Although it might be logical to infer that changes in all precedents on all issues, 
and not merely those related to the First Amendment, might be influenced by the same 
factors in the same ways, it would not be methodologically sound for this study to 
conclude that changes in membership, ideology, and public opinion affect shifts in 
precedent in the same way that these factors effect First Amendment cases. It may be 
more plausible to generalize these results to the entire population of all civil liberties 
cases, but even this type of generalization, while more accurate than generalizing to the 
totality of the cases heard by the Supreme Court, may be somewhat inaccurate. In 
applying these results to civil liberties cases, the different manners in which votes can be 
cast – either a liberal vote to expand the freedom at issue or a conservative vote to 
constrain the freedom at issue – are the same as those votes that can be cast in First 
Amendment cases (an obviously fitting result as First Amendment rights are themselves a 
category of civil liberties cases). Thus, it is somewhat reasonable to conclude that the 
factors influencing these types of votes will affect all such civil liberties issues in similar, 
though perhaps not exactly the same, proportion. 
 Based on the results discussed here, it is important to analyze the implications of 
these findings for the current Court. This study’s results showed that changes in 
membership, justices’ ideologies, and public opinion all play a role in determining when 
justices choose to alter policies established by the Supreme Court. Thus, if the three 
factors are operating together they should have a stronger effect on precedent than they 
have independently of one another. The Roberts Court, still young, appears to be on a 
markedly more conservative trajectory that its predecessors. With two new members who 
have yet to experience the so-called ideological drift, which generally occurs gradually 
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over a justice’s tenure on the bench, the current Court has revealed that it is not afraid to 
poke substantial holes in liberal precedent. Assuming that both Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito both become at least slightly more conservative, this will only push the 
Court closer to not simply corroding, but rather overturning, liberal holdings. Because 
“drifters” tend to influence one another, as well as other members of the Court, it is 
highly possible that Bush’s appointments will push the already-right-leaning Justice 
Anthony Kennedy farther to the conservative side of the spectrum. Further, the upcoming 
presidential election may in fact seat another Republican in the White House. Perhaps 
with his two new appointments, and with the liberal eighty-seven-year-old Justice John 
Paul Stevens approaching retirement, President Bush will have accomplished the 
realignment of the Supreme Court that conservatives have sought for the past forty years.
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